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A REAPPROPRIATION OF HEGEL:  
IS SITTLICHKEIT ALL IT’S  






All too often, Hegel is falsely characterized. For some, 
he is precisely what his philosophical adversary Arthur 
Schopenhauer said: a “shallow, witless charlatan” whose 
“wretched sophisms” and “senseless twaddle of proofs” are 
the pinnacle of “sham philosophy.”1  For others, he is the 
predecessor to totalitarianism, the forerunner of German 
fascism, who was able to not only anticipate, but justify state 
oppression of critics and the underprivileged.2  Yet despite 
these charges, Georg F. W. Hegel is still taken seriously by 
academia today; his great texts, still studied and discussed, 
frequently enter into dialogue with the deliberations over 
state-building today. Crucial to understanding both his 
perplexity and his appeal is the political philosophy he 
articulates in his 1821 work Elements of the Philosophy of 
Right, which attempts to lay the groundwork for a conception 
of an ethical life that allows people within the State to find 
freedom and liberation in a way that avoids hindering others, 
and elevates peoples’ status in an objective, rational way. In 
                                               
1 Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation. 
Translator and Editor: (E. F. J. Payne). New York, New York: Do-
ver Publications Inc., 1969, 249, 303, 442.  
2 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Elements of the Philosophy of 
Right. Translator: (Nisbet, H.B.). Editor: (Wood, Allen W). Cam-
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this paper, I will examine Hegel’s political thought in an effort 
to vindicate him from false accusations and provide a better 
frame for engagement with his work.  
Rooted in an incomplete understanding and of his 
formulation of the state, the charge that Hegel’s political 
thought is totalitarian is false; nevertheless, as his words may 
strike contemporary readers as perplexing — or outright 
alarming — an exploration of his thought is necessary to 
vindicate him. In his 1821 work, Elements of the Philosophy 
of Right, Hegel asserts the following:  
 
Similarly, in the state, as the objectivity of the concept 
of reason, legal responsibility [die gerichtliche 
Zurechnung] must not stop at what the individual 
considers to be in conformity with his reason or 
otherwise, or at his subjective insight into rightness or 
wrongness, good or evil, or at what he may require in 
order to satisfy his conviction.3 
 
For Hegel, since the state is objective form of the concept of 
reason, the legal responsibility it has to its citizens is not 
contingent on what certain individuals within society see as 
reasonable. If the state truly is reason made manifest, those 
who object to the rational laws set forth by the state are acting 
irrationally. To some, this model appears to imply that social 
critics and reformers are irrational and should be regarded as 
irrelevant, as they are failing to live up to moral living.  
A challenging question can be raised here: if critics of 
the state are failing to live up to proper moral living, what 
should we make of reformers like Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. 
and Mahatma Gandhi? On this model, they seem to be an 
obstacle to society’s well-being. Should we think Hegel is 
opposed to them? Or, is he able to countenance reformers’ 
immanent critique of the state they inhabit? In this paper, I will 
                                               





















argue that Hegel can support social critiques and that 
Sittlichkeit — his conception of ethical life — actually 
requires social reformers to promote moral progress and 
uphold the welfare of society. Ideally, I will offer a way to 
salvage Hegel’s thought from being falsely appropriated by 
totalitarian thinkers, and demonstrate how Hegel is more 
welcoming to the idea of social reform as a rational action — 
and moral duty —  than the purely duty-based slavishness to 
the state with which he is often associated.  
I shall advance my argument in steps. First, I shall 
examine what Hegel’s view appears to be and explain the 
basic concepts necessary to understanding his political 
philosophy with regards to state building and social 
responsibility. In particular, this section will show how Hegel 
resolves concepts that typically seem in tension with one 
another, revealing them to be complementary, rather than 
antithetical. Next, I will propose the endeavors and critiques 
of great moral exemplars as challenges to framing Hegel as a 
social justice advocate. Following that, I shall demonstrate 
how Hegel actually does not disregard social reformers as 
irrational, irrelevant beings, but instead requires them for 
developing the state to its full potential. Penultimately, I shall 
consider objections to my defense of Hegel. Finally, I shall 
respond to those objections and conclude that people who hold 
social reformers in high esteem can take Hegel and Sittlichkeit 
seriously, and regard his political thought as a route to 
objective freedom that supports social justice reforms.  
Hegel’s apparent view in Philosophy of Right is that 
dissidents and social reformers are irrational beings who are 
not at home in their communities because they do not act in 
accordance with the standards of their state. Vindicating Hegel 
of this charge — and making sense of his thought in general 
— requires a proper examination of what he means by 
Sittlichkeit. Sittlichkeit is essentially the idea that each 
respective person is who he/she is only because of the society 
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identity.4 Hegel posits that all people are not purely individual, 
autonomous beings. 5  Man is a political animal; always 
situated in a community, our identities are constituted by the 
state we are born into.6 Each state has history and tradition 
behind it; the cultural aspects and societal norms of our society 
shape its people as they develop.7 As Hegel puts it, “Since the 
determinations of ethics constitute the concept of freedom, 
they are the substantiality or universal essence of individuals, 
who are related to them merely as accidents. Whether the 
individual exists or not is a matter of indifference to objective 
ethical life.” 8  Consequently, Hegel argues that we find 
individual contentment and freedom when we conform to 
societal standards.9 
Since the state we are born into is what gives us our 
identity, Hegel proposes that we are forever indebted to the 
state; accordingly, the state deserves some gratitude. 10  By 
fulfilling our obligations, both to our fellow-citizens and the 
state that protects us, we manifest two of life’s most important 
tasks: building identity through others and giving meaning to 
our existence. “All these substantial determinations,” Hegel 
writes, “are duties which are binding on the will of the 
individual, as subjective and inherently undetermined — or 
                                               
4 Rose, David. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right; A Reader’s Guide. 
(London, UK: Continuum International Publishing Group., 2007), 
109. 
5 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 159. 
6 Westphal, Merold. History and Truth in Hegel’s Phenomenology, 
Third Edition. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press., 
1979, 1990, 1998), 139.  
7 Staehler, Tanja. “The Possibility of a Phenomenology of Cultural 
Worlds in Hegel and Husserl.” Hegel Bulletin, 38/1 (2017), 88.  
8 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 190. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Schmidt, Dennis J. “The Monstrous, Catastrophe, and Ethical 
Life: Hegel, Heidegger and Antigone.” Philosophy Today, Volume 





















determined in a particular way — is distinct from them and 
consequently stands in a relationship to them as his own 
substantial being.”11 Without duties to fulfill, without rational 
norms to uphold, without others to serve and help, people 
stand not only unfulfilled, but undetermined; one’s being is 
wrapped up in others who give it meaning, and it is through 
service that we build relationships and cultivate purpose. 
Because we owe the state payment for it granting us life and 
the ability to shape our identity, we must necessarily conform 
with its norms.12 Since the norms that have been actualized are 
rational (for they are actual), for a person in a state not to 
conform with that society’s standards is to act irrationally.13  
For Hegel, complete freedom is found by actualizing 
one’s individuality through the other, which is in turn 
actualized by fulfilling the objective standards posited by the 
rational state which constitutes him/her. 14  “The right of 
individuals to their subjective determination to freedom,” he 
writes, “is fulfilled insofar as they belong to ethical 
actuality.” 15  On this understanding, freedom is not the 
libertarian ability to do as one pleases: to be objective, 
freedom and independence must have rational meaning. Hegel 
points out that if you act irrationally or egotistically, you are 
not free — you are chained, either to the shadow cast by 
ignorance that veils your mind, the selfish passions of your 
heart, or the appetitive desires of your gut.16 For instance, if 
you choose to smoke cigarettes but then become addicted, you 
are not actually free to choose if you want to smoke them — 
                                               
11 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 191). 
12 De Nys, Martin J. “The Owl of Minerva: quarterly journal of the 
Hegel Society of America.” 43: 1-2 (2011-2012), 139. 
13  Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 41. 
14 Ibid, 196. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Houlgate, Stephen. “Right and Trust in Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right.” Hegel Bulletin, 37/1, The Hegel Society of Great Britain. 
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you are simply fettered to the nicotine, and must satisfy your 
body’s chemical cravings. 
Yet bodily desires are not the only ways individual 
freedom is lost to subjectivity: decisions that seem rational but 
are bound up with arbitrary whims also result in bondage. For 
example, people who conform to social norms to be accepted 
are arbitrarily dependent on others for self-worth; they miss 
the mark of objective social independence. Thus, following 
arbitrary subjective standards to actualize your interests is 
actually denying your individuality, and by extension, your 
freedom. The true way to actualize your freedom and act 
independently is to act in accordance with rational standards 
that have been actualized by the rational state which 
constitutes you. Although to some duty appears to restrict our 
natural desires, Hegel concludes that “in duty the individual 
finds his liberation . . . from mere natural impulse . . . In duty 
the individual acquires his substantive freedom.”17  
As pointed out by the scholar Tanja Staehler, the 
world we are born into predates us and acts as a “meaningful 
context...determined by senses, atmospheres, and ideals.”18  
Illustrating this fact, British philosopher F. H. Bradley 
observes that as a child grows up in the world, he does not 
think of himself as a separate entity; he develops with the 
world around him, and his identity matures as develops 
through his friendships, relationships, interests, and 
experiences.19 The language he learns to communicate with 
his community has been passed down by generations of 
ancestors, and the definitions express the same sentiments and 
ideas that his ancestors posited. His/her soul feels emotion 
when the symbols of his/her culture prompt it. Society thus 
makes its members feel that their identity is determined by 
                                               
17 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 192. 
18 Staehler, Tanja. “The Possibility of a Phenomenology of Cultural 
Worlds in Hegel and Husserl,” 93.  
19 Singer, Peter. Hegel: A Very Short Introduction. (Oxford, UK: 




















serving in that community. Noted scholar Peter Singer 
provides a helpful example of what the state and society at 
large thus require of its members. A member of a community 
is like a body’s limbs: the limbs act in accordance with what 
the brain commands. The brain is responding to the heart 
which sustains it. Arms and legs do not have brains in 
themselves and cannot decide for themselves what they desire. 
The limbs’ serve the stomach in various ways, and in turn the 
stomach keeps the heart pumping and brain rationalizing.20 
Since it is the state we are born into that constitutes 
our identity and existence, the standards and laws of the state 
are the only ways we can truly express our individuality. If the 
state is rational, we can only be rational beings if we act in 
accordance with the standards of the state. Thus, the laws of 
the state are actually a form of freedom. We would not be who 
we are without the spirit of the rational state; accordingly, to 
act contrary to that is to act erroneously or subjectively. As 
Hegel articulates, 
 
The fact that the ethical sphere is the system of these 
determinations of the Idea constitutes its rationality. 
In this way, the ethical sphere is freedom...whose 
moments...govern the lives of individuals. In these 
individuals — who are accidental to them — these 
powers have their representation [Vorstellung], 
phenomenal shape [erscheinende Gestalt], and 
actuality.21  
 
Sittlichkeit describes how a citizen can know his/her duties 
because social existence constitutes and determines right 
behavior. 22  These duties will be rational when they are 
“actual” and not merely “abstract.” Effectively, one can only 
                                               
20 Singer, Peter, Hegel: A Very Short Introduction, 48.  
21 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 190.  
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act freely when he/she is totally sure he/she is acting 
rationally: in other words, acting in accordance with the values 
set by the rational state.23 For Hegel, “Ethical life is the Idea 
of Freedom as the living good which has its knowledge and 
volition in self-consciousness, and its actuality through self-
conscious action.” 24  The individual’s sureness demands 
justification by the rational state, which in turn requires the 
subjective will of the individual to be in tune with it. Thus, the 
rational state needs to provide objective freedom that the self-
conscious subject can understand what is right and voluntarily 
approve of it.25 Hegel sees individual satisfaction and freedom 
unified when they conform to the “social ethos of an organic 
community.26  
However, if going against the standards set by the 
rational state or criticizing the ruling regime is acting 
irrationally, how are we to make sense of social critics and 
reformers through a Hegelian lens? Dissidents like Aleksander 
Solzhenitsyn and activists like Rev. King seem problematic, 
nay, even an obstacle on Hegel’s model. To extend Singer’s 
analogy, it seems that humanitarian advocates like Mahatma 
Gandhi and Frederick Douglass are actually biting the hand 
that feeds them by acting in their own self-interest. In the same 
vein, a number of states throughout history have clearly 
suppressed freedom on grounds they claimed to be “rational.” 
The United States denied blacks the right to vote in 1960 in 
“the interest of the nation as a whole.”27 The Soviet Union 
denied people basic health care and living necessities “in the 
                                               
23 Pinkard, Terry. Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Rea-
son. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 221. 
24 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 189.  
25 Ibid, 198.  
26 Singer, Peter, Hegel: A Very Short Introduction, 45.  





















interest of the community.” 28  None of these significant 
discriminatory legislative acts executed by states — all 
executed in the name of the common good — help Hegel’s 
case. If we approach the historical reality with Hegel’s 
description of the rational state, it seems easy to justify actions 
taken by governments that actually deny human dignity.  
Given such events, it is no wonder that Rev. King said 
in his I Have A Dream speech, “One hundred years later the 
life of the Negro is still languished in the corners of American 
society and finds himself in exile in his own land...there will 
be neither rest nor tranquility in America until the Negro is 
granted his citizenship rights.”29 In this speech, King not only 
admits that his people do not feel “at home” in their society, 
but advocates for political criticism for an indefinite time 
period. But might Hegel view these lines as damning evidence 
of Rev. King obstructing the strength of the rational state?  
Hegel lays out the foundations for the possibility of 
immanent critique in the requirements he sets for political 
structures to be rational. Political structures are only rational 
when they allow for three things: individuals must be able to 
pursue their interests, feel at home within their communities, 
and freely express their rational existence. Additionally, a 
rational state must possess certain qualities: it must have laws 
and institutions that secure basic life necessities, and its 
subjects must be able to voluntarily support the laws and 
understand the reasoning behind them.30  
For a state to be rational, it must have laws that allow 
individuals to pursue their interests.31 Recall Singer's original 
body analogy. One’s legs may not guide his/her brain, but both 
                                               
28 Mahoney, Daniel J. Aleksander Solzhenitsyn: The Ascent from 
Ideology. (Oxford, England:v Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc., 2001), 49.  
29 King, Martin L., Jr. "I Have a Dream." Speech. (Lincoln Memo-
rial, Washington, D. C. 28 Aug. 1963), 1-2.  
30 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 221.  
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need each other. Without the brain, the legs will die off, for 
they will have no direction, and thus no function to perform. 
In a hostile environment, without legs, the brain could die. The 
brain does not simply ignore the pain its nervous system feels 
when a leg is injured; rather, the pain signals the brain that 
something must be done to protect the leg from danger.32 It is 
a reciprocal relationship.  
Building off that analogy, I contend that the 
government actually needs to hear the voices of certain 
reformers because they can warn the government of 
impending danger, and allow the government to advance 
forward in society. Without the peaceful protests of Rev. King, 
America may not have benefited from African-American brain 
trusts like the economist Thomas Sowell, the physicist Neil 
DeGrasse Tyson, and the Associate Justice Thurgood 
Marshall. Additionally, such brain trusts might want to 
support the U.S. because, in some ways, it made possible their 
successes: by providing quality educational access, 
developing their identities through relationships they had, and 
giving them meaning through virtuous service, the country, for 
all its faults, ultimately allowed them to flourish. Following 
that, if society does not have laws in place that allow for 
individuals to freely pursue their interests without hindrance, 
it will not progress, as it will not meet the output standards it 
is capable of. By increasing suffrage universally, more groups 
are able to express their interests, which should eventually 
allow the groups to fulfill duties and make contributions to the 
state at maximum capacity.  
Thus, we can now see that all the requirements Hegel 
sets forth for a state to be rational actually complement each 
other: Hegel is not concerned with freedom to do as one 
arbitrarily chooses; he is concerned with freedom to act 
rationally in a way that actualizes your freedom as an 
                                               





















individual.33 Subjects in a state must be able to pursue the 
interests that are rational to have so that they can express their 
rational existence, which for Hegel is living freely.34  It is 
through the state that one develops an identity, one must 
further pay debt to the State by serving it and understanding 
that whatever duty they are voluntarily fulfilling for the State 
under its laws are reasonable.35  
But for citizens to perform their civic duties, they must 
have health-care access, quality living conditions, and a route 
to success unhindered by political discrimination. Hence, Rev. 
King proclaims, “We can never be satisfied as long as our 
bodies, heavy with the fatigue of travel, cannot gain lodging 
in the motels of the highways and hotels of the cities! We can 
never be satisfied as long as the Negro’s basic mobility is from 
a smaller ghetto to a larger one.”36 In the previous quotations 
is King’s contention that his people will be satisfied once they 
have fair lodging and equal access to opportunities. Therefore, 
if the United States does manage to genuinely secure those 
standards for the disenfranchised, the disenfranchised will 
naturally understand the laws as rational.  
But for all of this to occur, the state must first meet all 
the requirements. Since in the United States not everyone has 
equal access to health care benefits, employment and 
educational opportunities, or even legislative representation, 
the state is not rational in a Hegelian sense of the term. As a 
result, immanent critique by social reformers are actually 
required for the state to progress at all. Therefore, while 
Hegel’s totally rational state may not need immanent critique, 
no state is rational until it has fulfilled its obligations to the 
society that sustains it.37 In other words, until the rational state 
has reached its ultimate goal, it’s telos, it must openly 
                                               
33 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 41.  
34 Ibid, 77.  
35 Ibid, 191.  
36 King, Martin L., Jr. "I Have a Dream." Speech, 3.  
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encourage immanent critique. The end of history is only 
reached when all the requirements have been totally fulfilled.38  
As such, I contend that social reformers are not 
actually irrational according to Hegel, but rational beings who 
progress the state, and that their social reform is actually the 
fulfillment of the duty each subject — both the passive citizen 
and active reformer — has to its community. This is precisely 
why Rev. King declares proudly, “The marvelous new 
militancy which has engulfed the Negro community must not 
lead us to distrust all white people, for many of our white 
brothers, as evidenced by their presence here today, have come 
to realize that their destiny is tied up with our destiny.”39 
However, Schopenhauer returns to object to my 
response: when political theories are based on “constructive 
histories, guided by a shallow optimism” the governments 
they create “always ultimately end in a comfortable, 
substantial, fat” degree of success for the regime, but whose 
moral rectitude “remains essentially unaltered.” 40  In these 
systems, the only form of social perfection is “intellectual 
perfection” because of the philosophers that uphold the 
standards of the immoral regime; no matter how abhorrent, 
their philosophies justify the regime’s oppressive structures 
with abstract concepts. 41  The disgruntled lecturer raises a 
difficult challenge: could it be the case that Hegel’s logic is 
simply a totalitarian system built on a consistent ideological 
lie that coerces people into submission to the demands of the 
state? 
Though one can draw parallels, appropriating Hegel’s 
system as totalitarian would be an oversimplification; his 
thought avoids the charge of being totalitarian and prohibiting 
                                               
38 Ibid, 370.  
39 King, Martin L., Jr. "I Have a Dream." Speech, 3. 
40 Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation, 
443.  





















individual freedom because the state’s rationality is dependent 
on all its citizens feeling at home inside the state. Hegel 
realizes that freedom to do as one pleases often ends in 
slavery.42 If one chooses to do something arbitrarily, there is 
no rational justification behind it; one would simply be a slave 
to his/her ego, instinct, or appetitive desires. But, as 
distinguished scholar Pinkard points out, Hegel desires us to 
be free from coercion by other humans as well, and not just by 
natural desires and circumstances.43 An und für sich, In-and-
for-itself, requires being at home with oneself by finding itself 
in the other.44  Self-awareness can only be achieved if one 
recognizes other selves to make it aware: the state can only 
reach self-awareness by allowing all the members of its body 
to be free from coercion, which requires feeling at home in 
their society.  
Further, as Hegel views freedom as objective, it can 
only be available to people when they act rationally according 
to universal principles.45  In a communist society, peoples’ 
choices only work for the good of the state — but since a 
state’s justification for existence is supposed to be predicated 
upon rationality, it would not even exist in the rational sense 
if people were simply coerced into obeying its commands.46 
Like the body, a state is not complete without its parts: if some 
people are being tortured for the state to continue, the state is 
not truly rationally justified, as its people are not able to 
actualize freedom or feel “at home” within the state.47 If the 
majority in society disregards the dignity of certain members 
of society, the State has not developed to its potential. 
                                               
42 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 356. 
43 Pinkard, Terry. Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Rea-
son, 53.  
44 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 356. 
45 Pinkard, Terry. Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason, 
53. 
46 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 276.  
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Accordingly, Rev. King proclaims, “We can never be satisfied 
as long as our children are stripped of their adulthood and 
robbed of their dignity by signs stating, ‘For White Only.’”48 
Ultimately, I contend that Hegel does not deny the 
dignity of the disenfranchised and disregard the criticisms of 
social reformers like Rev. King and Solzhenitsyn, and that 
Sittlichkeit is relevant to contemporary society. It is precisely 
the opposite: Hegel acts as a call to action. In our society, we 
cannot realize our own freedom if there are members of 
society who are marginally oppressed. Without one of our vital 
organs, we cannot function properly to survive. I conclude that 
in reality, Hegel’s work truly endorses answering King’s call 
in I Have A Dream: 
 
Now is the time to make justice a reality for all of 
God’s children...They have come to realize that their 
freedom is inextricably bound to our freedom. We 
cannot walk alone. We cannot turn back...And if 
America is to be a great nation, this must become true. 
With this faith we will be able to work 
together...knowing that we will be free one day. When 
we allow freedom to ring, we...will be able to join 
hands and sing…”Free at last, Free at last, thank God 
a-mighty, We are free at last.49 
                                               
48 King, Martin L., Jr. "I Have a Dream." Speech, 3. 
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